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After dcvcloping a political cconomy approach to Canadian satcllite 
broadcasting, Innis' conccpt of "monopolics of knowledge" is applied to a 
critical account of thc history of the domestic satellite systcm. 
Suite au d6veloppcmcnt d'unc approchc 6conomico-politiquc dc la 
transmission canadicnnc par satcllitc, le conccpt dc "monopoles du savoir" 
chcz Innis s'avtrc d'unc cxtdmc importance dans I'histoirc du r6scau 
national. 
Thc purpose of thc papcr is to argue that through monopolics of knowlcdgc, thc 
devclopmcnt of a domcstic satcllitc systcm in Canada has bccn largely conlrollcd by 
the fcdcnl govcmmcnt and thc major tclephonc companies. Thc consqucncc of this 
politicocconomic arnngcmcnt has bccn the esublishmcnt of a satcllitc systcm that 
h s  had limitcd bcncfit for Canadian socicty. In particular. thc cultunl bcnclits to 
people living in northem Canada havc bccn questionable -- although much discussed 
in the policy documcnts (c.g. CRTC, 1980). 
The Political Economy Approach 
"Political cconomy" as a rcscarch approach has acquircd a numbcr of munings. 
In its cightccnth ccntury beginnings, it rcfcrrcd to the ncw ficld of economics which 
started with a much strongcr basis in political philosophy than it has reuincd today. 
In rcccnt years. somc Canadian rescarchcn have used thc political economy labcl to 
designate work that attcmpts to emphasize the strong intcrconncctions bctween the 
exercise of cconomic powcr and political powcr, especially as manifcstcd in the 
Canadian sutc and its relationships with the Unites States (Levitt. 1970; Lumsdcn, 
1970). Onc major theme in Canadian political cconomy that is relevant to the topic 
of this papcr is the dependency of the Canadian economy. From the Canadian 
viewpoint, the strength of the Amcrican cconomy is of perpetual intcrcst bccause of 
its powerful influences on the Canadian economy. There is some evidcncc to suggcst 
that the Canadian economy is undcrdcveloped. at least substantially less developed 
than those of the other nations usually represented at Economic Summits (the U.S.. 
U.K., Francc. West Germany, Italy and Japan). 
* This papcr was originally written in March 1987 and the vicws exprcsscd do not 
ncccssarily represent those of the author's current employer. 
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What kind of undcrdevclopment is meant hcre? Glen Williams (1983) suggests 
that one criterion to use in measuring devclopment is the degree to which exports are 
manufactured goods rather than raw materials. It is clear that, while Canada has a 
large surplus of trade in raw rnatcrials, it is heavily dependent on importing 
manufactured goods. Williams (1983:8) points out hat, leaving aside the Auto Pact 
Canada's pcrccntage of finished goods as a proponion of total exports was only 22% 
in 1980 -- compared to 71% for Japan, 60% for West Germany and 52% for the U.S. 
Countries usually regardcd as developing or semi-industrial, such as India or Brazil, 
show an export rccord as good as Canada's (23% and 22% respectively). By this one 
criterion, thcn. Canada seems to fall well below the nadons with which it prefers to 
associate. However, as Williams observes, thcrc are many other criteria considered 
rclcvant as measures of dcvclopment such as thc dcgrce of integration in thc cconomy, 
the gap bctwecn productivity and wages, and investment levcls. Hc concludes that 
thc Canadian cconomy is not undcrdevclopcd in thc way that pcriphcral economies 
are, although Canada docs suffcr from a case of arrestcd industrialization due to the 
undcrdcvclopmcnt of domestic manufacturing industries. Thc causes and 
conscqucnccs of this situation are complcx but ccntral to any discussion of it arc the 
scrious tradc imbalances for Canada, thc havy rcliancc on forcign capilal to invest in 
Can~dian industries and wcak cxpon markcts for Canadian-manufactur products. 
These conscqucnces arc intcr-rclatcd, as is thc vcxcd qucslion of forcign owncrship in 
thc Canadian economy. 
Wallacc Clcmcnt (1983: ch.2) states that the most significant sectors of the 
economy arc foreign-conuolled through owncrship and invcstmcnt, wih only a few 
remaining prcdominantly controlled by Canadians: finance, transport, utilities and fhe 
mass mcdia. Tcchnological lcadcrship by U.S. corporations has also playcd its part in 
this process of forcign conlrol, according to Clcment (1983:88). Thc attitudc of the 
state towards forcign investment and forcign control in the economy has bcen 
somewhat ambivalcnt. On the onc hand, it is firmly bclicvcd at thc fcdcral lcvel (and 
cvcn more emphatically by many provincial govcrnmcnts) that foreign investment is 
csscntial for Canadian prosperity. One thc othcr hand, "too much" forcign ownership 
-- although obscrvcrs cannot agrce on what level that would be -- is thought to be 
dctrimcncal to Canadian sovcrcignty. Also, somc sectors of the cconomy arc seen to 
be morc crucial for sovcrcignty than others. For cxarnple, the communications sector 
(mass mcdia and tclccornmunications) has been sccn by thc fcdcral govcrnmcnt in this 
light whcrcas consumer goods manufacturing has not received Lhe same attcntion. The 
satcllitc industry is a particular case in point of a strategically important industry, One 
that involves the dcsign and manufacture of high technology goods -- and also one 
thought to have export potential. It is useful to realize that federal policy priorities 
relatcd to cconomic sovcrcignty, support for high technology research and 
dcvclopment activities, asidc from efforts to improve broadcasting service covcWS 
havc bccn influential in thc dcvclopment of satellite policy in Canada. 
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Somc of those who usc the political economy approach regard Harold Innis as thc 
major scholx to have influenced thcir work. In particular, Innis' The Bias of 
~~mrnunication and Empire and Communications have providcd the basis for a 
plitical cconorny analysis of Canadian communications systems (Innis, 1951,1972). 
This version of Canadian political economy may be placed in a neo-Marxist analysis 
that is not Iheonly ideological kamework used. Ian Parkcr (1981) has argucd 
bat Marxin and Innisian analyses should be seen as complcrnentrrry to each othcr and 
that both are essential for the future devclopmcnt of political economy in Canada. In 
Parker's analysis. Innis' writtcn work has to be viewed as a whole and not dividcd 
artificially betwccn his economics and communication writings. Parkcr (1981:135) 
summarizes the analytical tools that Innis devclopcd throughout his work as: 
A gencralizcd concept of ovcrhcad costs; 
A recognition of Lhc historical conscqucnces of differing timc structures of 
capital; 
An apprcciadon of thc importance of tcrnporal and spatial problcms of cxccss 
capacity as dctcrminants of problcrns of "rigidity" and "bias"; 
An acknowlcdgcmcnt of thc cxtcnt to which such "rigididcs" and possibilities 
of joint production opcratcd to undcrminc the cffcctivcncss of the price 
systcm and rclatcd allowlivc rncchanisms; 
An awarcncss of thc ways in which monoplics of forcc and monopolics of 
knowlcdgc h2vc historically ariscn in rclation to thc cxistcncc of such biascs; 
A sensitivity to thc potential for politico-cconomic centralization and 
deccnualization incidcnLal to the adoption and utilization olpanicular mcans 
of communication. 
The timc or spacc "bias" of particular mcdia was an esscndal fcature of much of 
h i s '  work on communications. Thc space bias of satcllitcs is cvidcnt, literally and 
sl.mcturally. In pmicular, h c  cconomic rigiditics inhcrent in such biases can bc rcadily 
illustrated with rcfcrcncc to satcllitc communications. The Irugc-scale cxpcnditurcs 
nc&d to esfablish a satcllitc system preclude dcccntnlizcd control of the technology 
and create many opportunities for control by h c  ccntrc over the pcriphcry. Thcrc has 
also bccn the problcm of excess capacity in the monopoly scllcr of satcllitc channcls 
( T c h t  Canada) and h i s  h s  led to biascs and rigiditics in a markctplacc whcrc 
price-setting cannot bc vicwcd as olhcr than arbitrary. 
Whilc it is acccptcd that all h e  analytical tools and thcir associatcd conccpls arc 
lntcr-rclatcd in Innis' work, h c  following discussion conccnmtcs on the conccpt of 
' m o n ~ ~ o h c s  of knowlcdgc" and how this can bc used to undcrsland somc of thc 
Significant fcaturcs of Canadian satcllitc broadcasting. In discussing the rnonopolics 
Or bnowl~dg~ ,  Innis diffcrcntiatcd bctwccn thc oral mdition and rnodcrn systcms of 
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communication in tcms of the possibilities for monopolization. In his view, oral 
communication was essentially a decentralized. open system whereas mechanical 
systcms allowed for the development of a class of dominant persons who could own 
and control them, usually to the detriment of the interests of other pcople in the society. 
In particular, Innis took exception to the ideology of freedom of the press because he 
thought it was contradicted by the economic opportunities for press control afforded 
to ncwspaper publishers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Innis, 1951: 186). 
Jamcs Carey (1975: 40) has put forward the view that the Innisian concept of 
monopolies of knowledge has thrce dimensions: physical, structural and cultural. In 
the physical dirncnsion, the monopoly is controlled by whoever holds the crucial 
position in the technical system; there may be more than one such position. There is 
also thc structural dimension which can be controlled firstly by those whose financial 
support is essential to the opcrution of the system and secondly by those (not 
necessarily the same pcople) who have the technical expertise needed t operate the 
syslcm. Finally, there is the cultural dimension that can be controlled by those who 
decide what kinds of communication contcnt will be carried through the system. Such 
cultural domination is especially relevant to the analysis of mass communications 
systems. Through cultural control, it is argued by Innis and others. the opportunity 
cxists for dcfining what the dominant version of "reality" is in any particular society. 
In this papcr, we will review in turn the thrce dimensions of the monopolies. This 
analysis argues that the structural dimension is far more complex and restrictive than 
the physical dimension of control apparcnlly afforded Tclesat Canada. Finally, the 
cultural dirncnsion of the monopoly of knowledge is rcgardcd as exlremely important 
and most problematic in the social context of northern Canada and the native 
communities that exist thcre. 
The Physical Dimension 
Bcforc analyzing the physical dimension, it is necessary t outline the evolution 
of the Canadian satellite industry. The definition of the industry can mean simply the 
satcllite communications corporation (Telesat Canada) that has been given by federal 
statute a service monopoly throughout the counuy. Alternatively, it can refer to the 
manufacturing industry that is involvcd in, among olhcr activities, the design and 
production of satcllite cnl i  and earth-based monitoring, transmission and reception 
equipmcnt. This industry is also referred to as the acrospace industry. It depends 
hcavily on government contracts and, to a lesser extent, on private sector production 
ordcrs to survive. Telesat is a significant buyer of satcllite equipment and spacecraft 
from this industry. Involvement in space activities by private industry and government 
laboratories in Canada goes back at least to the late 1950s. By 1963, the Canadian 
Ionospheric Research program was approved for funding by the federal government, 
with the implicit assumption that related research and development would be 
performed by Canadian industry. Ionosphcric research via satellite began in 1959 with 
thc Canada-Unites Slates joint project that produced the Alouette and Isis series of 
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$ientific satellitcs. This highly successful series was followed by research on 
satellitcs. 
In 1964, Canada was a founding mcmbcr of Intclsat, thc opcrator of the global 
communications satellite system Lhal now scrves most countrics in the world. In early 
1967, a study published undcr the auspiccs of the Scicnce Secretariat of thc Canadian 
gave strong support to the dcvelopmcnt of spacc technology in Canada 
a central thcmc in Canada's space program (Chapman, 1967: 109): 
Application of space technology to specific Canadian nccds should be the 
central theme of the program. Canada needs satcllitcs for TV and telephone 
scrviccs to thc north. for augmenting communications east and west, for 
surveying natural resources, for surveillance of weather, spotting forest fircs 
and ice in shipping lanes and for many other purposes. The prime objective 
for space technology in Canada is its application to tclccommunications and 
survey problems of a large sparscly settled country. 
In July 1%7, a rcport was issucd by the Scicncc Council of Canada that endorsed, as 
the Secretariat study had donc. Lhc compctcncc of Canadian industry to undcrtakc thc 
design and manufacture of the hardware for a dorncstic satellite system. By thc end 
of 1967, thc Pcarson govcrnmcnt had dccidcd to usc satcllitcs to expand thc dorncstic 
communications networks. Then, in March, 1968, thc Ministcr of Industry issucd a 
White Paper on "A Domestic Satcllitc Communication Systcm for Canada" and this 
was used as the basis for the Tclcsat Canada Act. approvcd by Parliamcnl in 1969. 
According to the Whitc Papa (Minister of Industry, 1968:32) a domestic satcl l i~ 
systcm could have significant bcncfits for thc distribution of tclcvision scrvicc in 
Canada. First, it could make TV scrviccs available in both English and Frcnch across 
the country, which had not been possible to date. Second, it should do this at a lower 
cost and sooner than would be possible through expansion of existing tcrrcsuial 
distribution systcms. Third. it would allow the extcnsion of tclcvision scrviccs to many 
areas of the country prcviously unscrved because of thcir rcmotcness from thc main 
centres of population and from the U.S. border. Tclcsat Canada was established by 
statute in 1969 wi~h an cxclusive mandate to own and operate all communications 
satelk systcms in Canada. Its mandate appcarcd to include the ownership of all 
satellite receiving equipment (i.c., earth stations, also known as dishes) but this 
exclusivity was strongly challenged within a few years. 
Under section 5 of its statute, Ihc corporate objectives of Tclesat arc to "establish 
satellite communications systems providing, on a commercial basis, 
telecommunications services between locations in Canada". Also. Telcsat is directed 
to: 
utilize, to the extent practicable and consistent with its commercial nature, 
Canadian research, design, and industrial personnel, tcchnology and facilitics 
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in research and devclopment connected with its satellite telecommunications 
systems and in the design and construction of the systems. 
It was expected that the Government of Canada. the major common carriers and private 
shareholders would each have about one-third ownership in Telesat. However, the 
shares for gencnl issue have never been put on the market. By 1972, the federal 
government and the common carriers had provided thirty million dollars as the share 
capital of the company. 
Tclesat's fist satellite, Anik A-1, was launched in late 1972 and put into service 
in early 1973. The A series of three satellites was built by Hughes Aircraft, an 
American company. In April 1974, the fist official statement of government space 
policy was issued by the Minister of State for Science and Technology. Some of the 
main points (summarized in Department of Communications, 1980: 17) were: 
Govcrnmcnt purchasing policies should encourage the establishment of a 
viable research, development and manufacturing capability in Canadian 
industry .... 
Dcpartmcnts involved should submit plans to ensure that, to the fullest extent 
possible. Canada's sadlite systems are designed. devclopcd and construcled 
in Canada. by Canadians, using Canadian components .... 
Canada's primary intcrcst in space should be to use it for applications that 
conlributc directly to thc achicvcmcnt of national goals. 
It was cvidcnt from this policy that hcavy emphasis was to be placed on private industry 
participation in r c m h  and development of satellite systems. In May 1979, a 
significant stcp forward was made when Telcsat Canada signed a contract with Spar 
Aerospace to act as prime contractor on the production of two satellites in the Anik D 
series. In October 1986. Telcsat awardcd the construction contract for two Anik E 
dual-band satellites also lo Spar. 
While Telesat has the cxclusive Canadian mandate to own and operate commercial 
communications satellitcs, the federal government is involved in many different types 
of satellite usage, mainly experimental and scientific. The Department of 
Communications (DOC) has been heavily involvcd in experimental communications 
satellites but other dcpartmcnts such as National Defence and Energy, Mines and 
Resources have been interested in remote-sensing satellites. The government's 
collcctive cfforts have been mainly coordinated through the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Space (ICS), set up on 1969. In 1976, the Communications Technology 
Satellite (CTS) was launched as a joint endeavour of the DOC, NASA in the U.S. and 
the European Space Agency. According to thc DOC'S Annual Report 1975-76, one of 
the main objectives of the satellite was "to demonstrate high-power television and 
other transmission to small, low-cost earth stations". Expcriments using the satellite 
(later re-named Hermes) began in April 1976 and continued until June 1979. The DOC 
was responsible for the operation of the satellite and the management of the more than 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, VOL. 13 NO. 2 7 
twenty "social" experiments carried out. The social experiments were mostly projects 
to use satellite communications for the improvement of educational or hcalth scrviccs 
in remote areas. Experiments to improve intcr-community communications links were 
also conducted by several native organizations, including the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada. 
(All of these experiments should be differentiated from the technical experiments 
testing the use of Hcrmes, and its successor Anik B, for dircct-to-home television 
disuibution.) 
The DOC was also involved in the planning and dcsign of the fist dual-band 
satellite, Anik B, which was owncd and opcratcd by Telesat. A k r  the Anik B launch 
in December 1979, about seventeen "pilot projccts" that had developcd fmm the 
Herrnes experiments wcre allowed to use the higher frequency channels on Anik B (in 
the 13/12 GHz range); DOC leased these channels from Tclcsat for two years at a cost 
of $34 million. All the non-commercial expcriments and projects on both satcllitcs 
benefitted from having free satellite time and the provision of earth stations and other 
equipment from the DOC. However, this assistance could not be provided indefinitely 
and the experimentation came to an end in fall 1982. It had been hoped that the 
experimenlers would transfer their activities to Telesat's Anik C cornmcrcial 
operations but the cost of channel lcasing was too high for most of them. 
If we look now at the physical dimension of the monopolies of knowledge, the 
most striking fmture is the hwvy involvement of the federal govcrnmcnt in funding 
and encouraging the scientific and technical development of salcllitc technology in 
Canada. Without the federal government's major cxpcnditurcs on satellite research 
and development, it is unlikely that the Canadian private sector would have dcvclopcd 
a significant presence in the aerospace industries of the world. Thc fcdcral govcrnmcnt 
priorities in establishing an acmspace industry, and in enhancing the rcscarch and 
development basis for high technology industries gcncrally, wcre strong influences in 
the evolution of the satellite industry in particular. 
With regard to thc formation of Telesat Canada. this was also a federal initiative, 
one which detcrmincd that there would be only one corporation that could own and 
operate a satcllite system in Canada. However, it is worth noting that, while Tclesat 
Canada has been legally established as the monopoly seller of satellite-fed 
communications services in Canada, here are several significant limitations to this. 
First, it is not a monopoly seller of tclccommunications services in Canada or anywhere 
else. Canada has extensive terrestrial telecommunications networks (mostly owncd 
and operated by the telephone companies) and these can almost always provide a 
physical alternative to satellite carriage. In many instances, they are alsoeconomically 
more attractive to buyers of telecommunications services than the satellite alternative. 
Second, Telesat Canada docs not have exclusive access to Canadian territory from 
space since virtually all American domestic satellite signals can be rcceivcd in Canada 
as well as the U.S. The physical reach of Canadian and American satellite scrviccs 
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has had effects on the monopoly legislated for Tclcsat; the effects work in two 
directions. One consequence is that Telesat has been able to sell satellite services to 
American customers when there is insufficient American satellite capacity to 
accommodate servicc demand; however, this market is not reliable for Telesat and can 
appear and disappear abruptly depending on American satellite launchings and public 
policy. The second cffcct of the satellite systems' rcach is the tendency for Canadians 
to reccivc American broadcasting-type services from American satellites and, thus, 
undcrmine the Canadian scrvicc monopoly supposedly belonging to Telesat. In 
political terms, it is not always possible for Telcsat or the Minister of Communications 
to enforcc this monopoly. 
The Structural Dimension 
This dimension of the monopolies of knowledge contains a number of aspects that 
arc significant to understanding Canadian satellite broadcasting. First. there is the 
naturc of Tclesat Canada's owncrship structure and its cffccts. The limitation on who 
can be sharcholdcrs'has mcant that the major influences on the corporation's operations 
have inevitably come from thc fcdcml government (50%), Bcll Canada (about 25%). 
othcr telephone companics (16%) and other carriers (9%) such as CNCP 
Telccornmunications, through the parent railway companies. As already discussed, 
thc federal government's attitude towards Tclcsat has been mainly an interest in 
promoting a high technology industrial strategy. At the same time, the fedcral 
govcrnmcnt also wants to sce thc satellite systcm used for social bencfit, especially 
with regard to the extcnsion of broadcasting services. Thcre is also a recognition 
among somc policy-makers that satellite-fed broadcasting services to the north should 
bc adapted to thc cultural necds of the native pcople in the northern territories (the 
needs of native pcoplc living in the provinces, cspccially in southern areas, havc not 
been so prornincnt). To a considerable extent, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC) is expccted to provide culturally-appropriale broadcasting services in the north 
but no spccial funding has been provided by Parliament for program production to 
mect this purpose. 
Rcgarding scrvice coverage, however, since the start of Tclesat operations the 
CBC has been provided with special public funding to lease several satellite channels. 
Thcse channels are used to feed the English and French network services, and the 
Parliamentary channcl across the country; northern services in radio and television are 
also distributed in this way. As well as leasing satellite channels. the CBC was 
provided with spccial Parliamentary funds in the mid-1970s under what was called the 
Accelerated Coverage Plan (ACP). The Plan was to extend the local distribution of 
CBC radio and television service to unserved communities of 500 people or more. 
Eventually, in the north, the community size to qualify for local distribution of CBC 
signals was rcduced to 200people. As already observed, none of this extension activity 
included funds for new programming appropriate to the increasingly northern reach 
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of broadcasting services. The cultural dimensions of this arrangement were, and 
remain, the basis of much criticism from native people living in the north. 
The other half of the owncrship of Telesat has rested in the hands of the major 
telecommunications carriers and, it could be argued, their influence on the day-to-day 
commercial operations of Telesat has been significantly greater ban hat of the federal 
government. The principal telephone companies are members of an unincorporated 
association known as Telecom Canada (formerly called the Tnns Canada Telephone 
System or TCTS). These same companies arc most of the telecommunications carriers 
permitted to own Telesat shares. as well as bcing the main customers for Telesat 
channels in its early years. In order to secure some predictable share of the Canadian 
telecommunications carriage markct, Telesat became a mcmber of Telecom in 1976, 
with the permission of the fedcnl Cabinet Some indication of thc relative economic 
strcngth of Telesat and Tclccom can be seen in the market shares and opcrating 
revenues they enjoy. In 1982, Telcsat had a 0.7% share of the Canadian 
telecommunications markct comparcd to a share of 51.9% for Bell Canada and a told 
share of 86.9% for all the Tclecom members excluding Telesat (Dcpartmcnt of 
Communications, 1983). In 1985. Telcsat's operating revenues were $101 million 
while Bell Canada's revenues for 1985 were $5.76 billion. The major concern of the 
Telecom membcrs has bccn the need to ensure that Telcsat did not provide scrviccs 
competitive with those already providcd by the telephone companies. Until recently, 
Telesat accepted the intcrpremtion of its mandate  hat it was to be a "carrier's carrier" 
and not an independent carrier in its own right 
The close connection between Tclcsat and Telccom that began in 1976 has been 
changed considerably by amcndmcnts to the connecting agreement approved by the 
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) in May 
1986. There is now the possibility that Telesat will compete against the telephone 
companies in the provision of some services. Part of the reason for this shift in control 
may be due to the shift towards reliance on bmadcast services as the main source of 
Telesat's revenues. In its 1985 Annual Report, Telesat showed that 45.8% of revenues 
came from domestic broadcast services while 41.4% came from voicc/datdimage 
services. 
The operation of Canadian Satellite Communications Inc. (Cancom) is also 
relevant to a discussion of the structural monopolies at work in satellite broadcasting. 
After a series of complex public hearings, in Decision 81-252. the CRTC licensed 
Cancom, a private company, to provide certain Canadian radio and television signals 
b communities then underserved or remote from conventional broadcasting services. 
Cancom's licensed operations depend wholly on satellite delivery of the signals to 
local redistribution systems (either cabled or over-air) acmss the'counlry. As such, 
Cancom must deal with the monopoly seller of satellite channels. Telesat 
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Cancom itself has a structural monopoly regarding the legal provision of distant 
broadcast signals to specific communities designated by the CRTC as Cancom's "core 
market" -- that is, those communities receiving two or 'less television signals by 
conventional means. Since 1981. the CRTC has not licensed any other company to 
provide a sadlite-fed service like that of Cancom. In 1983, in Decision 83-126, the 
CRTC authorized Cancom to make available to its customers a selection of American 
TV signals representing the three U.S. networks and the PBS network (the 3+1 rule 
also used for cable systems). Dcspitc its supposedly favourablc position as a monopoly 
provider, Cancorn has had difficulty in operating profitably. The first signs of a 
profitable future appeared in the fourth quartcr of the 1985-86 fiscal year when the 
company declared a profit of SlO4.OOO. 
In sum, sevcnl structural monopolies cxist in the operation of lhc satellite 
broadcasting sysEm. First and foremost is thc monopoly position of Tclesat and the 
various owncrship. invcstmcnt and channel-leasing controls that have bccn excrciscd 
by the fedcral government and the major tclcphone companies. Second, there is the 
monopoly position givcn to Cancom by thc CRTC, for thc provision of broadcasting 
scrvices u, undcrservcd arms. Thc economically marginal operation of Cancom until 
rcccndy has m a t  thc company must concentrate on reducing its costs and on 
developing as quickly as possible the markels for its program packagcs in thc larger 
urban ccntrcs it is pcrmittcd to reach. Thcre has bccn littlc room for consideration of 
carrying unprofinblc, minority-intcrcst programming scrviccs such as those for 
nonhcrn native pcoplc although carriage of nativc-languagc radio programming was 
originally rcquircd by thc CRTC as part of the liccnsec's mandate. 
The Cultural Dimension 
Thc cultunl dimcnsion of thc monopolies of knowledge is an extrcmcly important 
part of this analysis. At its core, a cultural monopoly is the power to extend one 
dominant view of thc world to pcoplc previously out of rcach. Via satcllitcs, the rcach 
of Amcrican television programming contcnt throughout Canada is virtually complcte 
-- evcn in thc far north. A satcllitc communications system, as now organized, is an 
exccllcnt exarnplc of spatial control by one centre ovcr the rest of the country. 
Actually, it shows two vcrsions of this control: one is the extension of control from 
the U.S. into the far rcachcs of Canada; the other is from certain southcm Canadian 
cities to the "regions", including thc north. In both versions, it involves the greater 
control by metropoIilan ccntres ovcr the hinterland. 
Satcllitc broadcasting services carry very little new content; almost all the 
satellite-fed services are extension-s of existing television stations and networks or they 
arc re-formatted vcrsions of standard television content -- movies, sports, variety 
entcrtainmcnt, religious programming, dramas, news and so on --into special-interest 
channcls. There arc some radio broadcast signals canicd too but these are a minor. 
part of satcllitc broadcasting to date. Thcsc are also mainly retransmissions of 
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programming content produced in mcuopolitan centres although some native 
lan page  radio programming is distributcd on the CBC's Nonhcm Scrvice and some 
more is carried by Cancom. If one looks at who is in charge of creating the contcnt 
and program packages carricd on Canadian satcllites, these are basically: the CBC; 
Cancom (and indirectly some Canadian and American private broadcasters and PBS); 
and a fcw Canadian pay-TV and specialty service programmers. (Some Amcrican 
pay-TV services can also bedistributed by Canadian cable operators, under thecurrcnt 
CRTC policies; the signals are received from American satellites by the operators 
involved.) All of the programmers stick to the standard industrial practices of 
centralizing content production. acquisition and distributiori. Any opportunities for 
creating new sources of programming, purchasing new kinds of programming or 
designing new types of distribution nctworks have bccn almost entircly ignored since 
satellite broadcasting became possible in the early 1970s. 
A leading examplc of a producer of tclcvision programming for nativc pcoplc is 
the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), fundcd by the fcdcral govcrnmcnt sincc 
1981. (In 1987, thcrc wcre scven nativc communications socictics producing TV 
programs for distribution in various rcgions of northcrn Canada.) Thc IBC can 
produce limitcd amounts of programming for distribution lo communitics in thc 
Easlcm Arctic whcrc nativc Language speakcrs predominate. However, those hours 
are a fraction of thc total tclcvision programming rcccivcd in thc same comrnunitics. 
Also, IBC must rcly on thc CBC, which provides satcllitc access for a fcw hours cach 
week, if it wants to broadcast to the widespread comrnunitics. Furthcmorc, along 
with the twclvc othcr native communities socictics in Canada, IBC must dcpcnd on 
fcdcral govcmmcnt funding to opcratc thcir organization and producc programming. 
The funds in qucstion now comc largcly from the Northcm Nativc Broadcast Access 
Program, fist cstablishcd in 1983 and which provided up to S 0 . 3  million for all nativc 
communications socictics ovcr four ycars (Valaskakis, 1985). In May 1987, thc 
Program was establishcd on a pcrmancnt basis by thc Sccrctary of State and given a 
budgct of S13.2 million pcr ycar. 
Thc five policy principles on which the hogram is built arc: 
Northcrn rcsidcnts should be offcrcd access to an incrcasing range of 
programming choiccs through the exploitation of technological opportunities. 
Northcrn native pcople should have the opportunity to participate actively in the 
determination by the CRTC of the character, quantity and priority ofprogramming 
broadcast in predominantly native communities. 
Northcrn native people should have fair access to northcrn broadcasting 
distribution systems to maintain and develop their cultures and languages. 
Programming relevant to native concerns, including contcnt originated by nativc 
pcople, should be produccd for distribution on northcrn broadcasting scrviccs 
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wherever native people form a significant proportion of thc population in the 
scrvicc arca. 
5. Northcrn native rcprcsentativcs should be consulted regularly by government 
agencics engaged in establishing broadcasting policies which would affect their 
cultures. 
The Program is still relatively new and its effects on the production and 
distribution of native language programming for radio and television are oftcn limited 
to thc local lcvcl so far. The longer term effects on the broadcasting services available 
to nativc pcoplc in h e  north rcmain uncertain, espccidly if they cannot gain better 
acccss to the satellite-fed scrvices that predominate in the region. 
The CBC has also had a major role to play in northern Canada in providing 
broadcasting scrvices that are somcthing other than a strict extension of southern 
nctworks and Amcrican programming. Following the dcvelopmcnt of the Accclcrated 
Covcmgc Plan in thc mid-1970s, additional pressure was placed on the CBC to do 
morc than simply cxtcnd southcrn programming farthcr and farther into thc north. The 
cxpcricncc with CBC's radio scrvices in the north has bccn gcnerally good (although 
not all native cornmunitics arc satisfied) but thcrc havc bccn large difficulties with the 
tclcvision scrvicc providcd. The Northcrn Servicc in CBC Radio has bccn dcvcloped 
on a sub-rcgional basis in the tcrritorics, has become increasingly available in the 
northcrn arcas of many provinces. and has achieved a rathcr successful blend of local 
(somctimcs community-access), sub-regional, northern and national network 
programming for its listeners across the north. This has bccn possible through a 
combination of factors: thc relatively low cost of installing and operating a local radio 
bansmittcr with small studio attached; thc narrow bandwidth rcquircd for radio signal 
bansmission (via satellite or othcr mcthods): the flexibility of network arrangements 
to allow programming to originate from different centrcs at diffcrcnt times of day; the 
rclative ease with which pcoplc can be trained to produce radio programs; and the use 
of various languages in northern programming so as to reach most of the northern 
audicncc with some programmes each day. 
Tclcvision has been altogether diffcrcnt in its dcvclopment. Since 1973, the 
CBC's television scrvicc to the north has i s n  the subject of much criticism from its 
audicncc. The first major opportunity for the expression of public dissatisfaction was 
the CRTC hearing on CBC network licence rcncwals in 1974, when the two main 
complaints wcre of a disorganized schedule of programming and the irrelevance of 
much of what was broadcast (CRTC, 1974: 62-63). The latter criticism was a special 
problcm for native people, many of whom did not understand English very well, and 
whosc life cxpcricnce was no preparation for seeing programs about urban problems 
and action-packed American fiction. By 1979, the next CRTC hearing on CBC's 
liccnccs, the situation had not improved much for the Northern Television service 
(CRTC, 1979: 25-29). At special hearings held in northern communities, the CRTC 
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h& eighty-seven representations, most of them concerned about the irrelevance and 
inmsiveness of southern programming beamed to their area. Even the CBC officials 
at the hearings were ready to agree that the television service was unsuitable but their 
problem was lack of funds to produce appropriate content for the small audience of 
northem viewers. 
While native people have objected to the television service as irrelevant or 
culturally threatening, their hope is for a more relevant service using northern program 
producers. However, most northern residents who are not native people tend to have 
criticisms that are rather different For them the CBC's Northern Television service 
is unacceptable when it is the only channel available; they want more TV channels 
and preferably the same range of choice as the Canadians in southern cities receive. 
Cultural thrcats are less of a concern than is the isolation from television services they 
know other Canadians can see. Given these differences between native and non-native 
preferences in satellite television, and given the enormous costs attached to creating 
special scrviccs for the small northern population, the use of satellites for broadcasting 
in the north is fraught with difficulties if anyone tries to respond to the audience's 
cultural needs. The CBC has tried to respond but has consistently pointed out, to the 
CRTC and others. that the necessary funds have not been provided by Parliament. It 
may be that thc Northern Native Broadcast Access Program of the Secretary of State 
can, in the longer run and if adequately funded, provide the basis for a fully northern 
television scrvice. The programming is gradually being produced but the difficulties 
of gaining access to the satellite distribution systems are only just beginning. 
Conclusions 
The approach of looking at satellite broadcasting in terms of the monopolies of 
knowledge that may exist can be useful in pinpointing where the constraints are in the 
technological system. These constraints are much less likely to be technical barriers 
but rather are political and economic structures and rules established by governments 
and businesses for their own reasons. 
If we are trying to understand why there is the present flow pattern of broadcasting 
content via the Canadian satellite system, we find first of all that satellite research and 
development in Canada has been a joint effort by the federal government and the 
aerospace industry. Second, the Parliamentary mandate of Telesat Canada as well as 
its ownership, investment sources and channel-leasing practices all ensure that the 
cultural dimension of broadcast service extension is not considered by the satellite 
Corporation. Also, Cancom must concentrate on the satellite delivery of broadcasting 
signals that will make the company profitable; the cultural implications of the 
increased spread of southern television and radio signals to the north cannot be its 
major concern. 
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Third, while Parliament has required the CBC to extend its broadcasting services 
to as many Canadian communities as possible, there has not been the funding to 
produce new and relevant kinds of programs for the northern native audience that has 
been reached. More recently, the federal government's Northern Native Broadcast 
Access hogram has tried to respond to this lack by supporting just over a dozen native 
communications societies in radio and television program production but the 
distribution access remains elusive. 
It might be argued that the introduction of Direct Broadcast Satellites @BS) 
within the next few year is likely to create a less controlled satellite broadcasting 
system. While DBS appears to offer new opportunities for satellite dish owners and 
content packagers, what is likely to change is merely the ability of more householders 
to receive satellite signals directly rather than through a cable system or over-air 
transmitter. In Canada, the physical ownership of satellites will remain wilh Telesat 
while the economic and political constraints on satellite design and usage that are now 
exercised by government and business will remain essentially unchanged. 
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